



**JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT**  
**JOINT TEST AND EVALUATION**  
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OSD-JBDA

MEMORANDUM FOR Distribution

SUBJECT: 2003 Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E)  
General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) Meeting Minutes

1. The JBDA JT&E held the second annual meeting of its GOSC on 19 March 2003 at the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) facility in Alexandria, Virginia.

2. Mr. Andre Barnes of IDA hosted the meeting. GOSC representatives in attendance included Mr. Steve Bass, HQ USAF/XOIRB; LtCol Christopher Lewis, HQ USMC I, Intelligence Plans and Policy Division; and CDR Robert Marston, Naval Warfare Development Command. Lt Col David Courchene, Lt Col (P) John Liburdi, MAJ Mike Ganuelas, Mr. Phil Comstock, Ms. Jacqueline Crawford, and Mr. Craig Monroe represented JBDA.

3. Lt Col Courchene presented briefings on GOSC Objectives, GOSC Charter, and JBDA Program Overview. Lt Col Liburdi then briefed JBDA Enhancement Development. MAJ Ganuelas concluded the meeting with an overview of JBDA's analysis plan.

4. Major issues arising as a result of the briefings included:

a. JBDA interaction with US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

(1) Significant interest was expressed regarding JBDA's relationship with USJFCOM as it related to proposing and facilitating ownership of JBDA's enhancement and legacy initiatives. USJFCOM's role as joint force trainer and integrator was raised, and suggestions for close involvement were emphasized. Attendees stated that JBDA appears disconnected/uncoordinated with USJFCOM initiatives and that JBDA's efforts need to become part of a larger ongoing USJFCOM effort.

(2) Attendees applauded JBDA's decision to utilize the DOTMLP-F (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities) format for analysis and enhancement/legacy development. As DOTMLP-F is the standard in the joint arena, this will facilitate ultimate submission of products via USJFCOM to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

(3) JBDA was encouraged to investigate the utility and feasibility of becoming involved with USJFCOM's Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), Joint Fires Integration (JFI), and Joint Fires Transitional Initiative (JFTI) programs as they relate to BDA.

(4) Attendees stated that all Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) enhancements need to be coordinated with USJFCOM due to influence on “effects” which drive commanders’ decisions.

(5) JBDA was encouraged to offer instructional CD-ROMs to USJFCOM for use in battle damage assessment (BDA)-related exercises in order to provide familiarity and gain support for their transition to legacy products.

b. Translation of US Forces Korea (USFK) specific enhancements to other commands

(1) Attendees expressed concern that JBDA’s enhancements were “USFK-centric.” This was acknowledged as accurate in certain instances, but many enhancements are equally applicable to other warfighting commands. For those that are USFK specific, this is the unavoidable consequence of utilizing exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) as the major test venue. Based upon the demonstrated utility and acceptance of enhancements within USFK, JBDA plans to modify successful enhancements to support non-USFK commands as part of their transition to legacy products.

(2) Questions were raised regarding JBDA’s interaction with USFK personnel, specifically, the possible perception that the test may be an evaluation of, rather than improvement to, the BDA process in-place with USFK. It was explained that JBDA has made a practice of keeping USFK personnel well informed of not only operations, but findings as well, in order to maximize the collaborative nature of enhancement development. Regular briefings are conducted from the Action Officer all the way to the Flag Officer level. There was initial apprehension in-theater due to the perception that JBDA might simply point fingers at perceived problems and failures. However, extensive communication and coordination with key personnel at all levels before, during, and especially since the baseline test have demonstrated JBDA’s dedication to helping the warfighters today and have contributed significantly to the solid collaborative relationships currently enjoyed.

(3) The suggestion was made that JBDA invite representatives from other combatant commands to observe and participate in the major test events at UFL. This would provide JBDA with additional experienced personnel and a broadened perspective. Additionally, and possibly more importantly, this would provide first-hand knowledge and experience within the other commands on what JBDA does, as well as present the validity and value of what JBDA has to offer. This grass roots support may prove invaluable in legacy transition as JBDA strives to gain maximum acceptance of its legacy products. JBDA’s limited success in this area was explained and discussed.

c. JBDA interaction with Republic of Korea (ROK) forces

(1) The issue of JBDA’s relationship and interaction with ROK forces was raised on several occasions. Most notably, questions were raised regarding training of ROK personnel and the usability of JBDA enhancements by ROK forces. By charter, JBDA was tasked with testing, evaluating, and improving BDA as it is executed today at the joint (vice combined) level. Specific US governmental prohibitions prevent JBDA from passing information or products to

citizens and forces of other countries. Due to the intimate involvement of USFK personnel with all enhancement efforts, the products JBDA is currently developing should support sharing information and products that USFK plans to execute with ROK forces. However, this initiative must be handled by the appropriate USFK personnel, not by JBDA.

d. JBDA involvement with the Military Target Intelligence Committee (MTIC)

(1) During the course of discussion, JBDA's relationship and involvement with the MTIC was raised. Attendees inquired if JBDA had briefed the MTIC and if proposed enhancements were routed through the MTIC for approval. Due to JBDA's operational mentor being the Joint Staff/J2T (Targets), JBDA maintains an active relationship with the MTIC. JBDA attends regularly scheduled MTIC meetings and briefed the MTIC at both the May and November 2002 meetings. Although JBDA does not submit prospective enhancements to the MTIC for approval, MTIC support will be key to legacy product acceptance and deployment. It was noted that the chair of the MTIC is the J2T Director.

(2) Attendees reiterated their encouragement that JBDA utilize the MTIC to keep the operational community apprised of enhancement efforts, as well as to help develop understanding and consequent support for legacy products. Additionally, they emphasized the need to continue supporting trainers and to keep agencies informed of enhancement development. This will ensure agencies are aware of potential changes and prepared to accommodate these changes according to the joint BDA process, JBDA's formal mechanism for making recommendations for policy changes to the military.

(3) Attendees inquired as to JBDA's formal mechanism for making recommendations to the military for policy changes. The current process consists of problem identification and proposal of solution/enhancement within the respective theater followed by initiation of discussion with the MTIC (O-6 level) and within the GOSC. Assuming success at these levels, JBDA then pursues initiatives through Service representatives within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation, who serve on the JT&E Senior Advisory Council.

(4) Attendees strongly encouraged JBDA to also contact the JROC, specifically, the O-6 level Joint Requirements Panel and later, the General Officer/Flag Officer Joint Requirements Board, via USJFCOM, to provide an overview of the JT&E. This could provide post-JBDA advocacy within USJFCOM, as well as offer the Services and combatant commands an opportunity to become aware of and formally review the initiatives and legacy products.

e. Habitual reserve support relationships for combatant command BDA cells

(1) Attendees agreed that reserve augmentation to combatant command BDA cells has been historically problematic. Due to either a lack of formal standing requirements or deviation from an established internal staffing plan, deployed BDA augmentees are many times inexperienced and/or untrained. JBDA witnessed this during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the resultant enormous training effort required by the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) BDA Cell during combat operations.

(2) Attendees recommended that JBDA pursue the establishment of habitual support relationships between designated reserve intelligence units and the supported BDA cells in each of the combatant commands. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (JRISE) in Ft. Sheridan, Illinois, which supports the US European Command Joint Analysis Center (JAC), was noted as a model for this effort. The experience and expertise provided to the JAC by the Ft. Sheridan JRISE has been consistently excellent. JBDA stated that this effort is currently underway, but has met resistance in personnel channels. Attendees suggested JBDA open a second front by approaching the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Reserve Intelligence Program, which has oversight of Joint Reserve Intelligence Units. Additionally, they suggested the Military Intelligence Board, which includes RADM Jacoby, could be another potentially effective venue. Points of contact were provided for these organizations, and JBDA plans to follow up on both.

f. Weapons system imaging for air-to-ground engagement

(1) Regarding discussion on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, the issue of onboard imaging systems for strike aircraft was raised. Based upon the success of the aviation community's efforts to record all air-to-air engagements, it was suggested that the same effort be directed toward air-to-surface engagements. This could tremendously impact the speed of BDA feedback to the commander on the ground. Consequently, this could increase the number of strike sorties available due to an increase of in-flight redirects based upon early BDA reporting while simultaneously reducing the requirements on perpetually overloaded ISR assets.

(2) It was suggested that a future performance requirement be determined and instituted in order to ensure this need is addressed in future platform acquisition efforts, most notably the Joint Strike Fighter. Justification was that the future goal of achieving Rapid Decisive Operations would simply not be feasible without significantly decreasing the timeline to determine and relay effects to the commanders.

(3) Although both paragraphs 4.f.(1) and 4.f.(2) reflect interesting discussions, they were beyond the scope of this JT&E. At the discretion of the Joint Test Director, these issues may be addressed as the opportunity presents itself.

5. Although lightly attended, this was a beneficial event. JBDA brought several GOSC member organizations up to date on the program and obtained valuable feedback on how best to address future concerns. The information exchanged should assist significantly as JBDA drives forward with enhancement development and prepares to transition to the legacy handoff phase.

Respectfully submitted,

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